Current Circuit Splits by Staff, Circuit Review
  399
Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by 
a federal court of appeals opinion between October 31, 2007 and March 
31, 2008. This collection is organized by civil and criminal matters, then 
by subject matter. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended 
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive 
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. 
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CIVIL MATTERS 
IMMIGRATION 
Board of Immigration Appeals – A Crime of Moral Turpitude: 
Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2007) 
The 5th Circuit adopted the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) definition of moral turpitude which includes “an act which is per 
se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong. . . .” Id. at 391. The 
court noted that the defendant was convicted of misusing a social 
security number and “almost all other courts have agreed that ‘deceiving 
the government involves moral turpitude.’” Id. at 392. The 5th Circuit 
disagreed with the 9th Circuit to hold that a person who misuses a social 
security number should not be exempted from Crime of Moral Turpitude 
status. Id. The 5th Circuit noted that the 9th Circuit heavily relied on 
Congress’s committee reports, which exempted individuals “who use a 
false social security number to engage in otherwise lawful conduct . . . 
[and] should not be considered to have exhibited moral turpitude.” Id. 
The 5th Circuit reasoned that the 9th Circuit expanded a narrow 
exemption beyond Congress’s intent by extending the exemption from 
moral turpitude status meant for lawful permanent residents to a class of 
aliens whose acts were not necessarily exempt from moral turpitude 
status. Id. at 393. 
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
FICA – Definition of Taxable Wages: Univ. of Pittsburgh v. 
United States, 507 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2007) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether early retirement payments made 
by the University of Pittsburgh to tenured faculty constitutes taxable 
wages under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”), 26 
U.S.C. § 3121–28. Id. at 166. The 3rd Circuit held that “the 
relinquishment of tenure rights . . . does not alter the Plan payments’ 
character as compensation for services, and therefore as wages.” Id. at 
171. In doing so, the court agreed with the analysis of the 6th Circuit, 
noting that the “weight of authority holds that compensation paid to an 
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employee for services to her employer constitutes wages under FICA 
regardless of whether it is prospective (for lost earning potential), or 
retrospective (as a reward for past service).” Id. This conclusion parted 
with the 8th Circuit’s view that such early retirement payments 
represented the “relinquishment of [the faculty’s] . . . constitutionally-
protected tenure rights rather than as remuneration for services to [the 
University].” Id. at 170. 
 
Education Law – Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: 
Blanchard v. Morton School District, 509 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2007) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 created a cause 
of action for monetary damages under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”) for lost wages and suffering when a parent 
pursued IDEA relief on behalf of a child. Id. at 936. The court noted that 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not “create any right under federal law.” Id. The 
court also recognized that Congress amended the statute to include 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(1) in response to the Supreme Court holding that the 
IDEA was the exclusive means of remedying infringements on the rights 
it guaranteed, and that the provision generally provides judicial relief for 
“violations of any right ‘relating to the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of [a] child.’” Id. at 938.  
The 9th Circuit confronted a circuit split when interpreting whether 
the amendment of section 1415 meant that Congress “intended the IDEA 
rights to be enforceable under section 1983.” Id. The court noted that the 
1st, 3rd, 4th, and 10th Circuits have held that Congress did not intend 
such right to be enforceable under section 1983. Id. Conversely, the court 
acknowledged that the 2nd and 7th Circuits found Congress intended the 
right, and the 8th Circuit issued decisions reflecting both views. Id.  
The 9th Circuit adopted the reasoning of the 3rd Circuit to hold that 
because the IDEA provides a comprehensive judicial remedy scheme 
whereby a parent can obtain relief for violations of rights incurred in the 
pursuit of securing rights for disabled children, therefore Congress did 
not intend section 1983 to provide an independent remedy to IDEA 
violations. Id. Consequently, the 9th Circuit affirmed the decision of the 
district court and concluded that the IDEA’s enforcement scheme did not 
contemplate damages for lost wages and emotional distress obtained in 
the pursuit of obtaining benefits for a disabled child. Id. 
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FDCPA – Lawyer Communications: Evory v. RJM 
Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007) 
In this case, the 7th Circuit contemplated several issues split among 
the circuit courts of appeals regarding the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act. The 7th Circuit first explained that “any written notice sent to the 
lawyer must contain the information that would be required by the Act if 
the notice were sent to the consumer directly.” Id. at 773. After resolving 
the threshold issue, the court examined the circuit split on this issue of  
“[w]hether communications to lawyers are subject to sections 1692d 
through 1692f, which forbid harassing, deceptive, and unfair practices in 
debt collection.” Id. at 772.  
The 7th Circuit, siding with the 9th and 2nd Circuit Courts, 
concluded that “a representation by a debt collector that would be 
unlikely to deceive a competent lawyer, even if he is not a specialist in 
consumer debt law, should not be actionable,” since a non-specialist 
attorney could inform herself in order to represent her consumer clients 
effectively. Id. at 775. However, the court carved out an exception by 
holding that a false claim of fact that would be undiscoverable by a 
lawyer without extensive investigation “would be actionable whether 
made to the consumer directly, or indirectly through his lawyer.” Id. 
The 7th Circuit further addressed the issue of “[w]hether the 
determination that a representation is or is not false, deceptive, or 
misleading under section 1692 is always to be treated as a matter of law.” 
Id. at 772. Here, the court followed its own circuit precedent, concluding 
that a claim of deception can be rejected on the pleadings even though 
issues of deception tend to be treated as ones of fact. Id. at 776–77. 
Citing a prior 7th Circuit case, the court explained that, “‘undoubtedly, 
there will be occasions when a district court will be required to hold that 
no reasonable person, however unsophisticated, could construe the 
wording of the communication in a manner that will violate the statutory 
provision.’” Id. at 777. 
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CRIMINAL MATTERS 
SENTENCING 
Sentencing Guidelines – Recidivist Provision: United States v. 
Pacheco-Diaz, 506 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2007) 
In this case, the 7th Circuit considered the applicability of the 
recidivist provision of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) in determining a defendant’s 
sentence increase. Id. at 547. Noting the district court’s findings that a 
conviction for marijuana possession should be treated as a federal felony 
under the recidivist provision, the court also considered the actions of 
several different circuits while deliberating the issue. Id. Declining to 
follow the 9th Circuit’s position disregarding section 844’s penalties for 
repeat offenders, the court instead applied the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Circuits’ 
approaches to find that section 844(a)’s recidivist provisions must be 
applied “in determining whether a defendant’s prior state misdemeanor 
conviction should be considered an aggravated penalty.” Id. at 549. 
Because the court considered the other circuit holdings similar to the 7th 
Circuit’s holding in United States v. Perkins, which evaluated the crime 
of conviction, the 7th Circuit upheld the district court’s eight-level 
sentencing increase. Id. at 549–50. 
 
Sentencing Guidelines – Enhancements for Prior Convictions: 
United States v. Lopez-Salas, 513 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2008) 
The 5th Circuit agreed with the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuits 
regarding the use of a prior conviction of drug trafficking under state 
law, to enhance the sentence of a defendant tried for violation of federal 
law. Id. at 180. The defendant was convicted of drug trafficking under a 
North Carolina statute which equated trafficking solely with the amount 
of drugs in his possession. Id. at 177. The court, following the 
Sentencing Guidelines, had previously held that “a drug trafficking 
enhancement could not be supported by a conviction for transporting a 
controlled substance unless the predicate statute included as an element 
an intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Id. 178.  
In doing so, the court rejected the 11th Circuit’s conclusion “that a 
state statute that presumes an intent to distribute creates a drug 
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trafficking offense, as defined in section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)” of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 179. The 5th Circuit instead adopted the 
reasoning of the 10th Circuit, which stated “[f]irst, the absence of the 
phrase ‘that has an element’ from the definition of a drug trafficking 
offense is not significant enough to depart from the ordinary standard of 
review . . . Second, incongruous results do not justify a departure from 
the ordinary standard of review . . . [and although] [a]nomalies occur 
when the evidence a court reviews is intentionally limited . . . the 
Guidelines cannot be rewrit[ten] . . . simply because they might . . . 
produce an anomalous result.’” Id. at 180–81. 
 
Post Booker – Supervised Release: United States v. Bolds, 511 
F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2007) 
The 6th Circuit addressed the standard governing the post-Booker 
review of sentences imposed upon the revocation of supervised release. 
Id. at 573. The court recognized that that two standards of review exist:  
Booker’s “unreasonableness” standard and the “plainly unreasonable” 
standard in sections 3742(a)(4) and 3742(b)(4). Id. at 575. The court 
recognized that the 4th and 7th Circuits apply a “plainly unreasonable” 
standard of review while the 2nd, 3rd, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits 
apply the “unreasonableness” standard. Id. The court then found that in 
Booker, “the Supreme Court . . . was simply directing appellate courts to 
apply the same reasonableness standard that they use to review 
supervised release revocation sentences to their review of all sentences.” 
Id. at 575. Consequently, the 6th Circuit held that post-Booker, 
supervised release revocation sentences would be reviewed “in the same 
way that we review all other sentences.” Id. 
Bureau of Prisons – Placement in Community Correction 
Centers: Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2008) 
The 1st Circuit created a circuit split in holding that “the Bureau of 
Prisons (“BOP”) may, through rulemaking, deny placement in a 
community corrections center (“CCC”) to all prisoners during the first 
ninety percent of their sentences.” Id. at 31. The court found that the 
BOP may make rules of general applicability, which “must conform to 
the strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555.” Id. 
The court remarked that the BOP, in addition to considering certain 
factors mandated by Congress in making a determination, must also 
leave room in the rules for consideration of other factors. Id. at 32.  
The 1st Circuit remarked that its analysis differed from the other 
circuits in two respects. Id. at 31. First, it noted that its analysis of the 
406 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:399 
statute “reveals that the decision whether to transfer an inmate is not 
constrained by the factors Congress lists, although the decision where to 
transfer an inmate might be.” Id. at 31–32. Second, the court found that, 
“even in initial assignment decisions, the question whether a CCC is 
appropriate is only a part of the overall decision with which the BOP is 
charged by statute.” Id. 
 
Supervised Release – Tolling: United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d 
416 (6th Cir. 2008) 
The 6th Circuit decided a question of first impression, and 
consequently created a circuit split as to “whether pretrial detention with 
respect to an indictment that later yields a conviction tolls the running of 
a period of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3624. Id. at 417. The 
court noted that the 9th Circuit, the only other circuit to address this 
exact issue, concluded that “pretrial detention [does] not trigger a tolling 
of the period of supervised release. Id. at 419.  
The 6th Circuit observed that the 9th Circuit distinguished between 
“imprisonment” and “detention,” interpreting the former term to “refer to 
a penalty or sentence” while the latter term was “used to describe a 
mechanism to insure a defendant’s appearance and the safety of the 
community.” Id. However, the 6th Circuit was not persuaded by the 9th 
Circuit’s reasoning that “the phrase ‘in connection with a conviction’ 
means that a conviction must occur before any confinement can count as 
imprisonment.” Id. The court stated that if Congress only wished 
“imprisonment” to refer to a “confinement that is the result of a penalty 
or sentence, then the phrase ‘in connection with a conviction’ becomes 
entirely superfluous.” Id. at 421. Accordingly, the court declined to adopt 
the 9th Circuit’s distinction between “imprisonment” and “detention” 
and instead concluded that “‘imprison’ includes not only confinements as 
a result of a conviction, but any time the state detains the individual.” Id.  
The court then examined 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which “creates a 
connection between pretrial detention and a later conviction.” Id. at 422. 
The court weighed two factors heavily in its analysis: the connection 
between pretrial confinements and subsequent convictions, and the fact 
that Congress did not intend “imprisoned” to “exclude pretrial detention 
from the scope of section 3624(e).” Id. Accordingly, the court held that 
“when a defendant is held for thirty days or longer in pretrial detention, 
and he is later convicted for the offense for which he was held, and his 
pretrial detention is credited as time served toward his sentence, then the 
pretrial detention is ‘in connection with’ a conviction and tolls the period 
of supervised release under section 3624.” Id. at 417. 
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EVIDENCE 
Balancing Test – Prior Convictions: United States v. Kelly, 510 
F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2007) 
The 4th Circuit analyzed the circuit split between the 7th and 9th 
Circuits regarding the application of the balancing test under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403 when deciding whether evidence of prior offenses 
was admissible under Rule 414. Id. at 436–37. The court found that, even 
if a prior conviction for child molestation qualifies for admission under 
Rule 414, evidence of that conviction may nonetheless “be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice” to the defendant. Id. at 437.  
The court concluded that the application of the Rule 403 balancing 
test to prior offenses admissible under Rule 414 required the district 
court to “consider a number of factors, including: (i) the similarity 
between the previous offense and the charged crime; (ii) the temporal 
proximity between the two crimes; (iii) the frequency of the prior acts; 
(iv) the presence or absence of any intervening acts; and (v) the 
reliability of the evidence of the past offense.” Id. at 437.  
The 4th Circuit then noted the split among the circuit courts as to 
whether a district court must address these or other specific factors to 
make findings. Id. The court acknowledged that the 9th Circuit required 
other specific factors to be considered while the 7th Circuit used a more 
flexible approach that did not dictate a specific analysis. Id. The 4th 
Circuit adopted the 7th Circuit’s approach, stating that a district court has 
“‘wide discretion’ in admitting or excluding evidence under Rule 403.” 
Id. The court noted that this standard better reflected the fact that “a 
district court is much closer than a court of appeals to the ‘pulse of a 
trial.’” Id. 
